Overview 1) Can we construct preference profiles for which the aggregation judgments of large majorities of neutral survey-takers robustly violate Arrow's criteria of IIA and collective rationality?
2) If such violations occur, are they the result of robust and widespread agreement among surveytakers about what preference aggregation procedure (or family thereof) should be applied to profiles generally?
3) What principles characterize neutral surveytakers' revealed social preferences? 4) What is the proper role of experiments in solving the practical problem of selecting a social choice rule for a given population?
DEFINITION: A social welfare function f is an Arrow social welfare function if
• the domain D of f contains all possible preference profiles R N (universal domain), and • the range R of f is the set of weakly ordered social preference relations R N (collective rationality).
THEOREM: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Arrow, 1951 (Arrow, /1963 . There can be no Arrow social welfare function f satisfying all of the following:
• for all social outcomes x, and y in X, if a preference profile Arrow on IIA "The essential argument in favor of this principle is its direct appeal to intuition." (1952) "Stricter than desirable" but has practical benefits, necessary to keep the lid on the need to gather limitless information on unavailable options (1967) Dead candidate example: If an election were held and one of the candidates then died: "Surely the social choice should be made by taking each of the individual's preference lists, blotting out the dead candidate's name, and considering only the orderings of the remaining names…" (1951/1963) . DEFINITION: Given a set X of social outcomes, a preference profile R N , and a social choice rule C: x R N * y (meaning there is a revealed social preference for x in relation to y) iff there is some environment S ⊆ X, such that x and y are in S and x is in C(S,R N ).
DEFINITION: Weak axiom of revealed social preference. Given a set X of social outcomes, a preference profile R N , and a social choice rule C, a social preference relation R N satisfies inter-menu consistency 1 (IMC) iff it is a revealed social preference relation under C for all pairs of social outcomes in X, and the following condition holds: For all environments S ⊆ X, if x and y are in S and x is in C(S,R N ), then for all environments S' ⊆ X such that x and y are in
THEOREM: If R N * is a revealed social preference relation associated with a set X of social outcomes, a preference profile R N , and a social choice rule C, and R N * violates inter-menu consistency, then it violates collective rationality. 
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Question 1: Can we construct preference profiles for which the aggregation judgments of large majorities of neutral survey-takers robustly violate Arrow's criteria of IIA and collective rationality?
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Out of 59 subjects, 55 ranked P ahead of M, while only 4 ranked M ahead of P. Assuming that they would have ranked M ahead of P if only shown the voting blocs' preferences over these two alternatives, we can say that the subject group, as a whole, is violating the IMC criterion. 
